13 rather than to protect the individual from abusive limitations to his or her rights and freedoms by the State, as it is emphatically suggested in the formulation of this article and its location in the Chapter relating to the duties of the individual. 31. At any rate, in the final analysis, and as stated by the African Commission and confirmed by the Court in Paragraph 112 of the Judgment, this provision may be viewed as a general claw-back clause which restricts the margin of maneuver of States Parties as far as limitations are concemcd. The on ly limitations to the exercise of the freedom of association and the right of citizens to freely participate in the government of their countries would consequently be those required to ensure "respect for the right of others, collective security, morality and common interest". 32. One can thus conclude that, according to the African Charter, the freedom of association and the right to treely participate in the government of a country arc not absolute as the exercise of such rights is subject to limitations by the States Parties. One can equally conclude that the powers of limitation by States Parties arc also not absolute in that they must comply with certain requirements: the restrictions must be provided by law and should be necessary to ensure "respect for the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest". 33. Consequently, it lies with the Respondent State to show that the restrictions it has applied to the freedom of association and the right to freely participate in the govcmmcnt of the country were not only provided by law but also necessary to ensure "respect for the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest".