23. In any event, the two reasons advanced by the Court (see supra, paragraph 14), in particular that "the issues raised by the Authors are of general public international law [hierarchy of international nom1s] and not o.flwman rights". ~ See for example the reasons developed by lhe International Court or Justice and the european Court of I Iuman R1ghts lor dcclming their jurisdiction to provide the opinion reqLICSted: Advisory opinion of ICJ of H July 1996 on tbc Legality of rhe Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict and the decision of tbc t:::uropcan Court of 2 June 2004 on th~ Competence o(rhe Court to gtve an advismy opinion. v indeed touch upon the material j urisdiction of the Court. In dismissing the reques t on this basis, the Cour1 implicitly ruled on its material j urisdiction and this is a question that it should have addressed in the co ntext of the procedure laid down in Rules 69-73 of the Rules. It would have been desirable for the Court to rule on this request by way of an "advisory opinion"3 or at the least by way of a "decision'.4, rather than a simple Order signed only by the President of the Court. 24. J would observe, in substance, that when se ized of a request for advisory opinion, the Court should ensure that it has both the personal and material jurisdict ion to deal with the request. It foUows, from a reading of the present Order, that the Court is co ncerned only with its material jurisdiction and, thus, seems to have taken its personal j urisdiction for granted. As the Court did not in thi s case pronounce itse lf on the locus .standi of the four non-governmental organizations seeking an adv isory opinion on the bas is of Article 4 ( J) of the Protocol, it does not seem to me appropriate to express my opinion on this issue.