4 or the International Court of Justice. for example 7, undergo a process or \ertmg prior to being regi stered or served on the States against which they were institu ted. 16. In this case, the application did not go through th is initial proce dural phase of veiling. It was trea ted in the same way as the applications brought before the International Court of Justice before 0 l July 1978. date of entry into force of its new Rules". Prior to that date, all cases brought before the Court, including those in!>1ituted again st States that had not previously accepted the Court's jurisdiction by making the optiomll decla rati on accepting the compulsory jurisdiction provided for in Article 36 (2) of the Statute, were indeed placed on the general list and served on the States against which they were institu ted. and on the United Nations Secretary General and, through him, on all the other members of the Organization. 17. As indicated in the foregoing paragraph 13, procedural acts similar to the aforesaid were undertaken io connection with Mr. Yogogombayc's application; this was, inrer alia, served on Senegal under covering letter datl!d 5 Jl:lnuary 2009 18. Senegal acknowledged recei pt thereo f by letter dated I0 February 2009 in which it also transmined the names of those to represent it before the Court. At thar stage, Senegal could have lim ited itself to indicating that it had not made the decla ration provided for in Article 34 (6) of the Protocol and that, consequenlly, the Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the application on the grounds of the provisions of Article 5 (3) of the Protocol. However, by notifYing the Court of the names of its represcntati vt!s, it gave room for the suggestion that it did not exclude appearing before the Collli and of participatin g in its proceedings, with doubts as to the objec t of 1ts participation: to conte st the Cour rs jurisd iction, contest the admissibility of the app lication or to defenJ itc;elf on the ml!rits of the case. 19. By a second letter dated 17 February 2009, Senegal reque sted the Court to extend the time limit for submission or its observations to "enable it to berter prepare a reply to the application" By so doing, Senegal signaled its intention to comply with the provi sions ofRu le 37 of the Rules according to which "the State Party again st which un application has been tiled shall respond thereto with in sixty (60) days provided that the Co ur~ may, if the need arises, grant an e>.tension of time•·. Even in this lener, Seneg al did not exclude the eventual acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. Still at this stage, it could have put up the argument that it has not made the declaration provided for in Article 34 (6) of the Protocol and, on that ground, contested the jurisdiction of the Court. ' 1L should be mentioned that the: ref.:rence to the pracuce of the European Court of Human R1gh1S and the lnter-Amcncan Coun of Human R1gh1S IS nf limlled mterest in this regard, given thm the question of person:ll jLmsd1ct1on is posed in dd"rerent terms before th.:se two Courts. In the tnll:r-Americnn Court, indiVldunls hav1ng no d1rect access to the Coun the: question ol personal JUiisdicuon mdeed arises only m regard 10 State Pan1es; m the Eurnp.:an Court where 1ndlv1duals hove direct access to the Court. n hus au tom nth: jurisdiction solely on CouOCII or Europe 10 the European Convention on Hum !In Rights. the: ~round of the pnrt11ap111ion oJ the member Stutes of the 1 Ruh: 3!!. paragraph 5, of the curn:nt Rules of Procc:d ure of the: International Coun of Jusuce states that: ··When the Applicant Stale propuscs to found th e JUrlsdlcllon of the Cnur upon u consent thereto ye t to be given or mani festc:d by the: Swte agtunst wh1ch such uppllc:uion is mod~. the: npphca uon shall be transmined ,,, 1ha1 <:;1u1e ll....ahAll1tm hm~gyq 11n1sred 111 thL Os;uern l I-''Sl. nor uoy dlt!l!ln r he bs: mkc:n m !he proceedmgs. unle~> and until the State ngamSJ which such apghcation is mode consents to !he Couo's Jurisdic tion for the oumoses of the case'"(emphasls added)