2 7. Nevertheless, if the exprt:ssion "mrer alia" also refers to the conditions for admissibility of the application. there wou ld no longe r be any logical linkage between paragraph 31 and paragraph 29 of the Judgml!nt in which the Court indicated that it would start by considering the question of its jurisdiction. It would be particularly difficult to understand the meaning orparagrnph 39 in which the Court gives its interp retation of the word ·'receive" as used in Article 34 (6) of the Protocol. In paragraph 39. the Court indeed points out that the word ·'receive" as applied to the application should not be understood in its literal meaning as referring to '·physically receiving" nor in its technical sense as referring to "admissibility"; rather it refers to the 'jurisdiction" of the Court to ''examine·· the application: that is to say, its jurisdiction to hear the case. as it states very clearly in parag raph 37 infine of the Judgment. 8. Read in light of paragraph 39 of the Judgment. paragraph 31 shou ld therefore be interpreted as referring exclusively to the question of the Court's jurisdi'ction. 'Iince the meaning ofthl! expression "mter alia" is unckar, the Court had better tlo away with it. 9. Even if the expression is removed therefrom, paragraph 3 I of the Judgment, and also paragraph 34 thereof, pose the question oftht! Court'sjurisdkt ion in terms that do not faithfully reflect the Court's liberal approach to the treatment of the applic ation. I 0. In the foregoi ng two paragraphs of' rhe Judgment, the question of the Court's jurisdiction is indeed posed by the exclusive reference to Articl e 5 (3) and Article 34 (6) of the Protocol. However, Article 5 essentially deals with the questi on of''Access to the Court" as the title clearly indicates. Thus, the question of the personal jurisd iction of rbe Coun in this case cannot but receive the response set forth in paragraph 37 of the Judgment, i.e., that since Senegal has not made the declaration provided for in Articl e 34 (6) of the Protocol, the Court has no jurisdiction co hear cases instituted direct ly against lh_is State by individual5. This ruling could have been made expeditiously in terms of the p~eli minary consideration of th~ Court's jurisdiction as provided for in Rule 39 of the Rules . I I. Though of fundamental importance to the question of the personal jurisdiction of the Court. Article 5 (3) and Article 34 (6) of the Protoco l shoul d b<.: read in their context. i.e. in particular in light of Article 3 ofthe Protocol entitled "Juris diction" of the Court. 12. Indeed, although the two are closely related, the issues of the Court's ''jurisdiction" and of "access'' to the Court are no less distinct. as parag raph 39 of the Judgment in fact suggests 1; iL is precisely this distinction that explains why the Court did not reject de plano the application given the manifest lack of jurisdiction, by mean s of a simple letter issued by the Registry, and why it rook time to rule on the app~ication by means or a very solemn Judgment. 1 On thb polnl. see ror exumph:, Prosper Well '"ho notes DS lolluws "jurbd 1c:Lton and sc:l7.Urc: urc: not onl)' dis11nct conceptually; thc:y are separate 10 time. Normally, jurisdic tion prccccds se1zure I 1. In cc:rtain ~uses, however, the Se(jucn , ce muy be reversed", {Tmnslatiun by the Rc:g~:;ll)'( "Comp~tenc: et sutsmc: un nouvel asp.:cl du pnnctp e tie In jundi•·tinn consen suellc" , In Jerzy Mukurczyl.. (cu.). 17uwry of Jntuna llonaf J.ow at the Threshold of tile list Century - E.1says In Honour qf Kr=YS::tofSkubls=ewski, Kluwer Lllw Intern~ rhe llugue/London/Doston, 1996, p 839