v indeed touch upon the material j urisdi ction of the Court. In dismissing the request on this basis, the Cour1 implicitl y rul ed on its material j urisdictio n and this is a question th at it should have addresse d in the context of the procedure laid down in Rul es 69-73 of the Ru les. It would have been3 desirable for the Court to rul e on this request by way of an "advisory opinion" or at the least by way of a "decision'.4 , rather than a simple Order signed only by the Presiden t of the Court. 24. J would observe, in substance, that when seized of a req uest for advisory opinion, the Court should ensure that it has both the personal and material jurisdict ion to deal with the request. It foUows, from a reading of the present Order, that the Court is concerned only with its material jurisdict ion and, th us, seems to have taken its personal j urisdictio n for granted. As the Court did not in this case pronou nce itself on the locus .standi of the four non-governmenta l organizations seeking an advisory opini on on the bas is of Article 4 ( J) of the Protocol, it does not seem to me appropria te to ex press my opinion on this issue. Fatsah Ouguergouz Judge Rob Regi See for example the afore-mentioned advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 on the Legctluy of rile Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons m Armed Conflict, by which the lntemalional Court of Justice declares that it does no1 have JUrisdiction to give the opinion requested. 3 See for example lhe afore-men tioned decision of 2 June 2004 on the Competence oj the Court to give an advis01y opinion, by whJch the European Cour1 declares that il does not have jurisdiction to give the opinion requested. 4