9. Regardtng the st·cond reason g1vcn by the Court (the conlinuallon of tht~ alleged violations), Lhe Court oughl to have examined these allegations more closclv and possibly estabhsh a distinction between Lhc "mstantaneous" and the "continuous" facts, as 1t approprintelv did an another JUdgment delivered on m~lter the !iamc day, in the or the Benejic1anes of late Norbert Zongo and al. u. Bttrkma Fasrrl. ll should have ask<'d itself whether U1c alleged violation ol ArL.icle 15 of lhe Charter (lhe dtsmtssal of Lhe Applicant by U1e UniversH\> of nol an "'mstant.ancous'' fact outside the ratione tempons jurisdiction of the Court, and whether on the conlrcuy lhe alleged vtoli::ll10n of Malawi) was Article 7 of the Cht=trlcr (the mannt•r in which the JocaJ Courls handled lhe maller) was not a "continunu::;" fact, jurisdiction. An indepth analy~1s wh1eh falls within its temporal of these 1ssues would have enabled the Court ro arrive at a more informed conclu:-;ion w1lh regard lo ILS JUrsdiction ratione temp oris. l 0. In our opinion, the:: Court therefore missed an opportumty Lo make clear jurisprudence on nn issue which will likely resurface tn the future. m. The issue of exhaustion of local remedies ll. The most serious problem raised by lhe judgment of the Court however 1s its approach and dectston on the question of exhaustion of local remedtes. After a summary of how Lhc various local Courts handled lhe matter occasions !paragraph~ 011 several 21 lo 28 and 39), the Court roncludes in substance lhal the Appllcanl did not exhaust local rcrncdies 1 because he dirl nol argue the appeal wh1ch he had brought before lhc High Court agamsl a decision of the Industrial Relauon~ Court, and that under such conditions. he could not go to the Supreme Court of Appeal if he wr.rc not to be satisfied with the dt!dsion of the Hjgh Court regarding h1s claims for reparation for unlawfuJ dismissal (paragrapla 40.1 ). 1 The :!1 Jurw 20l:JjudgrnN1t J)rtrngmph tl:l, 4